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Abstract
Recently in the field of policy studies, there has been a renewed interest in research that connects
policy design with broader governance outcomes. As opposed to past studies of policy design that
have characterized policies along broad categories of variables, however, recent studies have sought
to systematically assess the language of public policies and resultant outcomes. This paper contributes
to the existing and emerging literature on policy design by coupling a content analysis of polices
governing the aquaculture industry in two U.S. states and interviews with aquaculture commu-
nity members to understand policy design and perceptions of policy legitimacy, coerciveness, and
enforcement.
KEY WORDS: institutional grammar tool, institutional analysis and development framework, Q-Sort,
aquaculture, policy design
Introduction
One key facet of governance is designing public policies to shape the behavior
of constituents in ways that support the attainment of policy objectives (Robichau
& Lynne, 2009). Policies contain carefully crafted directives that, together, specify
the array of behavioral opportunities and constraints available to target pop-
ulations within a particular domain. Thus, through carefully constructed lan-
guage, they have the potential to profoundly shape individual behavior, and
ultimately, the contexts in which they are applied (Bobrow & Dryzek, 1987;
Linder & Peters, 1989; Schneider & Ingram, 1997). To truly assess the valence
of policies, however, one must gain a comprehensive understanding of not
only what they are intended to do, but also how individuals interpret them.
Equally important is uncovering the types of factors that are most salient in
influencing this interpretation. With this in mind, this paper brings together
scholarship on policy design and regulatory compliance to answer the following
two research questions in the context of aquaculture in Florida and Virginia,
United States: (i) What is the design of policies governing the behavior of aquaculture
participants in Florida and Virginia; and (ii) What is the relationship between perceptions
of policy legitimacy, coerciveness, and enforcement in shaping individuals’ interpretations of
regulations?
Much of the policy design scholarship conducted to date has focused either on
the types of policies that result in particular contexts (Lowi, 1964; Wilson, 1979) or
has examined policy designs along broad categories of variables, such as policy
tools, instruments, benefits and burdens, and target populations (Dahl & Lindblom,
1953; Schneider & Ingram, 1997). Recently in the field of policy studies, there has
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been a renewed interest in analyzing the characteristics of policy design but with
more attention to the specific language used to direct behavior in rule-governed
situations (Mondou & Montpetit, 2010; Siddiki, Weible, Basurto, & Calanni, 2011).
Assuming that individuals internalize and respond to individual directives rather
than general policy characteristics, this paper continues on this recent stream of
research. Toward this effort, a content analysis approach for syntactically organizing
policy language was applied to code all state-level policies governing the conduct of
aquaculture in two U.S. states. These coded data were then paired with data
collected through semi-structured interviews involving a Q-Sort exercise with 30
members of the aquaculture community in the study states to better understand
policy interpretation.
Aquaculture, defined as “the propagation and rearing of aquatic species in
controlled or selected environments” (NOAA, 1980), is an increasingly salient
domestic and international policy issue. Though capture fisheries production has
plateaued over the last three decades, the aquaculture industry has seen an annual
growth rate of 8.3 percent worldwide (NOAA, 2012). According to the U.S. National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, this makes it the fastest growing form of
food production in the world (NOAA, 2012). Globally, government involvement in
aquaculture in the form of economic incentives and regulations has increased in
tandem with industry growth (Hishamunda, Bueno, Neil, & Yap, 2009), though
there is significant variation between countries in the quantity and design of aqua-
culture regulations as well as monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to support
them (Read & Fernandes, 2003).
In the United States, a high trade deficit and concerns regarding wild fish
stocks have spawned governmental interest to encourage the industry’s develop-
ment. Just as observed elsewhere in the world, as the aquaculture industry grows,
so too has the number of policies designed to govern it. Aquaculture policy
making and regulating in the United States has largely been devolved to the state
level. Similar to other U.S. policies designed for natural resource-based indus-
tries, aquaculture policies tend to be fairly technical and decentralization of gov-
ernance mechanisms is common (May, 2005). Such decentralization means that
the types of policies and supporting mechanisms vary widely from state to state,
as does their receptivity. For example, when new policies are applied in states that
have well-established industries, receptivity to them depends, in part, on how
consistent they are with industry members’ own conceptions concerning how the
trade should be conducted. It also depends on how contextually appropriate
regulations are perceived as being. Given the transitioning policy landscape per-
taining to U.S. aquaculture, it provides an apt context in which to explore ques-
tions of policy design and interpretation.
This paper proceeds as follows: the next section provides a brief overview of
the relevant, existing literature relating to policy design, legitimacy, coerciveness,
and enforcement. Following that, key characteristics of the aquaculture contexts
in the study states are described as are theoretically and analytically pertinent.
Next I describe the case selection, data collection, and analytical procedures
employed, followed by a summary of the research findings around each of the
posited research questions and a discussion of these results in relation to the




Public policy scholars are logically interested in the structure and design of policies
and have examined these variably. In recognizing the context-dependent quality of
policies, some scholars have identified relationships between policy designs and the
political and social dynamics of the environments in which they are applied (Lowi,
1964; May, 1991; Schneider & Ingram, 1997; Wilson, 1979). Other scholars have
focused their attention on answering broader societal level questions, such as, what
is the relationship between policy design and democracy (Mondou & Montpetit,
2010; Schneider & Ingram, 1997)? Still others’ efforts have been aimed at gaining
a systematic understanding of the content of policies and uncovering the policy,
administrative, and behavioral implications of such (Bardach, 1977; Gormley, 1990;
Huber & Shipan, 2002; Linder & Peters, 1989; Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 72;
Siddiki, Basurto, & Weible, 2012).
Within studies of policy design, to complement existing research, more formal
assessments of policy interpretation are required. Such studies are necessary for
signaling where one might expect to observe congruencies and discrepancies
between how policies are intended to shape behavior on paper and what policy
targets do in practice; that is, the de jure and de facto rules that govern behavior
(Ananda, Crase, & Pagan, 2006; Ostrom, 2005). To conduct such an assessment, this
research pairs a comprehensive study of the design of state-level policies with an
exploratory investigation of how individuals within one internationally salient
industry context interpret them. For the latter analysis, the focus is specifically on
exploring the relationship between perceptions of policy legitimacy, coerciveness,
and enforcement in shaping policy interpretation. To identify these factors, the
author drew from the policy compliance literature. This literature is considered to
be most conceptually and theoretically proximate given that policy interpretation is
a logical antecedent to policy response (e.g., compliance) (Ajzen, 1991). This study
is considered exploratory given the lack of existing research in public affairs on
policy interpretation and/or theories of policy compliance that point to suites of
factors that should be analyzed in conjunction.
Policy Legitimacy
Policy legitimacy is described here as the perceived “appropriateness of the laws or
regulations that an authority is enforcing” (Murphy, Tyler, & Curtis, 2009, p. 3). In
varying respects, it has been found that policy effectiveness, receptivity, and
response are tightly coupled with the degree to which policies are viewed as being
appropriately crafted for the contexts in which they are being applied (Jentoft,
2004; Ostrom, 1990, 2005; Young, 2002). Young (2002) uses the concept of insti-
tutional fit to explore how governing rules are crafted to address unique context-
specific ecosystem challenges. Treating “fit” in broader terms, Ostrom (1990, 2005)
looks at the ways in which rules are designed to reflect the local resource, political,
and social conditions of rule-governed domains. She draws upon extensive empiri-
cal research to show that perceptions of institutional (e.g., policy) appropriateness
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along these dimensions is an influential compliance determinant. Similarly, Jentoft
(2004) asserts within a fisheries context that when fishers lose the ability to feel
morally committed to “values such as honesty and respect for rules” (p. 144), the
ascendancy of regulatory over regulated agents begins to diminish, thereby increas-
ing chances of policy noncompliance. Furthermore, where regulating and regu-
lated actors possess disparate beliefs regarding how an industry should be
managed, scholars argue that those being governed may question the legitimacy of
governing bodies as well as the legitimacy and fairness of the directives themselves
(Gezelius, 2003; May, 2005; Ostrom, 1990). This, in turn, may negatively impact
compliance levels (Bardach & Kagan, 1982; Levi, 1988; May, 2005, p. 321).
For this research, I adopt Ostrom’s (1990) and Murphy et al.’s (2009) conceptu-
alization of policy legitimacy—the extent to which rules are perceived as reflecting
the local resource, political, and social conditions of the contexts wherein they are
applied. This broad definition is also interpreted in a regulated industry context to
include the extent to which policies accurately reflect the scope of activities that
policy targets are regularly involved in.
Policy Coerciveness
Another factor bearing significant implications for individuals’ policy interpreta-
tions is perceptions of policy coerciveness. Policy coerciveness is defined here as the
degree to which policies are designed to control the behavior of policy targets,
either through the wording of policy directives (e.g., “you must do x”) or through
the imposition of behavioral incentives (e.g., financial or administrative sanctions).
Each of these two dimensions of policy coerciveness is described in more detail.
First, through carefully crafted language, policies identify behavioral opportunities
and constraints by specifying behaviors that are allowed, required, or forbidden
within a given context (Hart, 1997; Huber & Shipan, 2002; Ostrom, 2005). With
respect to incentives, policies designate sanctions for noncompliance (Hart, 1997).
Sometimes these sanctions are explicitly stated within the specific policy being
applied. Other times, given the nested nature of policies (Ostrom, 2005), sanctions
are implied or carried over from related policies. Policy designers deliberately craft
policies to be coercive/noncoercive in ways that best facilitate the achievement of
their objectives. Thus, it is critical to assess the degree to which coercive policy
language is actually perceived as being such.
Both dimensions of coerciveness described here can be operationalized through
linguistic analyses of policy content. For example, the identification of behavioral
opportunities and constraints can be assessed by examining the prescriptive opera-
tors, or deontics, linked to different policy activities. Commonly observed deontics
in policies, include “must,” “must not,” “may,” and “may not,” which imply varying
degrees of behavioral constraint. Ostensibly, directives containing “may” deontics
afford individuals greater freedom in making behavioral choices than directives
that contain “must” and “must not” deontics. According to scholars of deontic logic
(Beller, 2008; Buccarelli & Johnson-Laird, 2005), directives containing deontics can
be either categorical or conditional. In categorical statements, an actor is required
(must), forbidden (must not), or permitted (may) to perform an activity without
clear exceptions that would modify the applicability of the deontic. In a conditional
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deontic statement, a temporal, spatial, or procedural parameter is identified that
modifies the applicability of the deontic. For example, the following statement is a
categorical directive: “Any person permitted as an oyster aquaculture harvester
must possess a permit on his person while harvesting.” The same example in
conditional form is: “Any person permitted as an oyster aquaculture harvester must
possess a permit on his person while harvesting unless that permit is in the posses-
sion of a legally permitted oyster aquaculture product owner, and the permitted
harvester is harvesting oysters of that oyster aquaculture product owner.” In the
second example, where the deontic containing directive is conditional, the “must”
deontic is modified to “may” deontic under certain circumstances. In general,
within a shared linguistic context, scholars have found that individuals have a
reasonably high level of deontic competence (Beller, 2008) and perceive differing
levels of constraint from must/must not deontics and may/may not deontics. Beyond
deontics, another way policy coerciveness is also linguistically determinable is
through an examination of the number and types of sanctions associated with
noncompliance with policy-directed activities.
Linguistic-based operationalizations (e.g., deontic-based operationalizations) of
the concept of policy coerciveness such as those described in the preceding para-
graphs represent a slight departure from the extant literature on policy coercive-
ness. Most of the policy literature on policy coerciveness has offered general
definitions of the concept relating it to different types of policy instruments (Lowi,
1972; Macdonald, 2001; Salamon, 2002, p. 25; Woodside, 1986). For example, Lowi
(1972) differentiated between policies that seek to control individual behavior
directly versus those that seek to control behavior indirectly through the environ-
ment. In a similarly general way, Salamon (2002, p. 25) defined coerciveness as: “the
extent to which a tool restricts individual or group behavior as opposed to merely
encouraging or discouraging it.” Rigby (2007) sought to provide a more concrete
definition of coerciveness in her study of early childhood education policy. Concrete
measures indicating policy coerciveness within her research context included items
such as the preservice education required for teachers and requirements regarding
teacher–child ratios in childcare centers. Although these measures offer a contri-
bution in their more detailed operationalization of the concept of policy coercive-
ness, they are limited in the extent to which the measures are transferable to
different contexts. That is, they are tied to the substantive context of the research.
Linguistic-based approaches are more transferable in that the types of prescriptive
operators used across policy contexts are typically comparable. The ability to iden-
tify these and policy sanctions is made even easier with the aid of methodological
tools designed to deconstruct the language of policies.
It is useful to emphasize the difference between policy coerciveness and policy
compliance. Policy coerciveness is a measure of how forcefully—either through
language or behavioral incentives—a policy intends to shape individual behavior
through the individual directives of which it is comprised (Lamond, 2000). Com-
pliance relates to whether individuals behave in a manner that is consistent with
regulatory directives. Although conceptually distinct, clearly, one’s internal valua-
tion of regulatory directives vis-à-vis their coerciveness portends resultant compli-
ance behavior. As such, this research is interested in perceptions of policy
coerciveness.
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Enforcement
Consistent with May and Burby (1998) and May and Winter (1999), regulatory
enforcement is defined here to include both regular interaction between regulatory
personnel and regulatees as well as the choices made by regulatory authorities
regarding the administration of sanctions for noncompliance (May & Winter, 1999,
p. 626). Enforcement has the capacity to influence individual responses to regula-
tion by reinforcing, undermining, or otherwise modifying the perceived coercive-
ness of individual directives (Ostrom, 2005). For example, where regulators enforce
weak sanctions when the regulations call for strong ones, the coerciveness of the
regulations may be undermined (Hart, 1997). Similarly, regulations can be under-
mined when regulators adopt lenient interpretations of “must” deontics; that is,
when “you must do x,” is actually enforced as “you may do x.” The assumption
following should not however be that stringent enforcement will always lead to
higher compliance. Scholarship that examines the relationship between enforce-
ment and compliance clearly shows that stringent enforcement can lead to lower
levels of compliance where it is perceived as being inflexible, inappropriately
stringent, or unsympathetic. This type of enforcement is contrasted with “coopera-
tive enforcement,” in which regulators adopt a more flexible approach to enforce-
ment (Scholz, 1991).
May and Winter (1999) further parse styles of enforcement—rigid vs.
cooperative—along two dimensions to relate to different aspects of enforcement:
formalism and coercion. According to May and Winter (1999, p. 627): “We define
formalism as the degree of rigidity in interactions that varies from informal conver-
sations and the influencing of attitudes to rigid application of rules on the part of
inspectors. We think of coercion as the degree of severity of the threats that inspec-
tors are willing to issue, ranging from not issuing warnings at all to threatening to
report or to impose penalties for violations.” Enforcement of regulations can vary
along these two dimensions; i.e., stringent enforcement along one dimension can
differ from stringent enforcement along the other. In either case, individuals’
expectations regarding enforcement, in terms of either formalism or coercion, will
temper their perceptions of the policies.
Study Setting: Virginia and Florida, United States
This research was conducted in the context of aquaculture in two states, Virginia
and Florida, United States. The United States currently produces 9 percent of its
seafood consumed while importing 91 percent, resulting in a seafood trade deficit
that exceeds 11.2 billion dollars annually (NOAA, 2012). This deficit has prompted
federal and state policy makers to encourage the development of a domestic aqua-
culture industry. The production of aquaculture involves consideration of complex
interdependencies among ecological, economic, technical, and social factors
(Firestone, Kempton, Krueger, & Loper, 2004), resistance from the public regard-
ing farmed seafood (Amberg & Hall, 2010; Mazur & Curtis, 2006), and numerous
concerns about the industry from disease control to degradation of marine ecosys-
tems (Black, 2001; Francik & Hershner, 2003; Mazur & Curtis, 2006; Naylor et al.,
2000; Treece, 2002).
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In recent decades, both Virginia and Florida have supported active shellfish
and finfish aquaculture industries. While both states are generally better known
for their shellfish production, Florida has also recently housed a thriving orna-
mental fish industry. Virginia and Florida share biophysical characteristics making
the states amenable to broad-scale shellfish production, though state leasing and
siting policies may limit the availability or access to such resources. Both states, for
example, have abundant water sources for supporting shellfish aquaculture. In
addition to the Chesapeake Bay in Virginia, the state contains a number of estu-
aries along the Atlantic coast (Luckenbach, O’Beirn, & Taylor, 1999). In Florida,
both the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts provide many suitable locations for shellfish
production.
The governments of both states have expressed state-level support of aquacul-
ture, touting economic and environmental benefits of shellfish production. This is,
no doubt, partly attributed to the fact that aquaculture is a multimillion dollar
industry that provides employment opportunities in addition to supporting the
state economy. Additionally, the states support aquaculture from an environmental
standpoint as shellfish production improves water quality in the areas where it is
being conducted, supports local ecosystem diversity, and preserves wildstock
(Virginia Marine Resources Commission, 2011). The preservation of wildstock was
a primary impetus in both states to grow the aquaculture industry.
In order to facilitate the development of the industry, both states implemented
work transition programs for commercial shellfishermen who were encouraged to
seek careers in aquaculture. They were provided basic aquaculture training and, in
some cases, subsidies to establish shellfish aquaculture operations. In addition to
such programs, both Virginia and Florida have created aquaculture opportunity
zones in which individuals interested in entering the aquaculture industry may do
so with the aid of state subsidies to reduce start-up and input costs. By inviting
newcomers to the industry such state-level efforts have contributed to more het-
erogeneity within traditional aquaculture communities.
Altogether, state support of aquaculture has resulted in the growth of the indus-
try, both in terms of sales and the number of farmers, thereby punctuating positive
and negative impacts and eliciting increased attention by policy makers and the
general public. To respond to these developments, a variety of regulations have
been established in Virginia and Florida to manage the industry. In Virginia, the
Virginia Marine Resources Commission is the primary regulating agency charged
with implementing and enforcing state-level aquaculture regulations. In Florida,
the Division of Aquaculture was established in 1999 within the Department of
Agriculture and Consumer Services for this purpose.
Changes in the regulatory environment and industry composition raise impor-
tant policy design and perception questions in a context like aquaculture wherein
strong individual and industry-level best management practices (BMPs) existed
long before the introduction of state-level policies, regulating the trade involves
nuanced understandings of geographic- and species-specific considerations, con-
cerns over product integrity are paramount, and where reputational concerns is a
significant behavioral motivator (Siddiki et al., 2012). Given the presence of all of
these characteristics, aquaculture provides an appropriate setting within which to
further an understanding of policy design and interpretations.
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Methodological Approach
Case Selection
This research involved a two-state, comparative, most similar case study design. A
preliminary study was first conducted to select an appropriate sample of study
states.1 Given the questions guiding this research, two states were chosen for the
analysis using data from the preliminary study that had reportedly similar political,
regulatory, social, community, and industry characteristics, biophysical attributes,
and overall levels of policy compliance but differed with regard to the level of
stringency (or coerciveness), of state aquaculture policies: Virginia and Florida
(please see the Appendix for a listing of theoretically relevant variables upon which
the study states were compared). Having similar levels of compliance but differing
levels of policy stringency would indicate to the author that aquaculture community
members in the two study states differ in the ways they respond to policy coercive-
ness on paper. The preliminary study data indicated that Virginia’s policies are
relatively nonstringent as compared with Florida’s. In addition to comparability on
theoretically important variables, these states were also comparable in terms of the
types of aquaculture produced, the presence of both marine and inland aquacul-
ture, and the relative establishment of the aquaculture industry. To corroborate
findings from the preliminary study and ensure that the cases were appropriate
selections given the analytical objectives of the researcher, informal interviews with
three state aquaculture coordinators2 were conducted.
Data Collection
Data collection for the research reported in this paper was conducted through a
content analysis of aquaculture policies and interviews that involved a Q-Sort
exercise. For the content analysis, all aquaculture policies, or parts of policies
pertaining to aquaculture, from the two study states were coded using the institu-
tional grammar tool (IGT); in Virginia, there were eight such documents, and in
Florida, there were four. The IGT (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995, 2005) is a content
analysis tool for systematically dissecting the content of institutions (e.g., policies,
laws, and regulations) by parsing the individual components that comprise them in
accordance with a grammatical syntax. Institutions can be embodied in written form,
such as in laws, regulations, or policies, or be reflected in social norms. Regulatory
policies are the particular type of institution under consideration in this paper, and
the subsequent discussion will use the term “policy(ies)” in place of “institution.”
A first step in applying the IGT is deconstructing the policy under consideration
into individual institutional statements. Crawford and Ostrom (1995, p. 583) define
institutional statements as “the shared linguistic constraint or opportunity that
prescribes, permits, or advises actions or outcomes for actors (both individual and
corporate).” In other words, these are the individual directives that describe activities
that a particular actor is required, permitted, or forbidden to perform within certain
conditions and penalties associated with not carrying out the activity as prescribed.
A second step in applying the IGT is further parsing institutional statements into
words or phrases using a grammatical syntax based on the part of the statement
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they represent. The six syntactic categories included under the IGT include the: (i)
Attribute [A], the actor to whom the statement applies; (ii) oBject3 [B], the animate
or inanimate receiver of action within the statement; (iii) Deontic [D], the prescrip-
tive operator that indicates whether the focal action of the statement may, must, or
must not be performed; (iv) aIm [I], the action of the statement; (v) Condition [C],
the temporal, spatial, or procedural boundaries of the action; and (vi) Or else [O],
the punitive sanction associated with not carrying out the statement directive as
prescribed. At a minimum, institutional statements must contain an Attribute, an
aIm, and a Condition. The following statement would be dissected using the IGT
as follows: “Any person violating any provision of this chapter [pertaining to
restrictions on shellfish harvesting] [Attribute] shall [Deontic] destroy [aIm] all shell-
fish in his possession [oBject] in the presence of a Marine Police Officer [Condition].”
One can analyze IGT-coded data by aggregating data within and across individual
grammatical components to gain a detailed understanding of the document being
examined.
Following a coding of aquaculture policies in accordance with the IGT, a test of
intercoder reliability was conducted in which an additional person other than the
author coded one of the aquaculture policies from Virginia in entirety—the Virginia
Enclosures Rule. The Enclosures Rule contains 63, or 5 percent, of the total
statements coded between Virginia and Florida policies. The coding for each syn-
tactic element per institutional statement between the author and this person’s
coding was compared to assess the degree of agreement. The goal was greater than
80 percent agreement among coders across syntactic components. For each of the
components, the following percentage agreement was observed between the two
coders: Attribute (95 percent), oBject (83 percent), Deontic (94 percent), aIm (95
percent), Condition (79 percent), and Or else (97 percent). The lowest agreement
was observed for oBjects and Conditions. These results from the intercoder reli-
ability test are consistent with Siddiki et al. (2011) and Basurto, Kingsley, McQueen,
Smith, and Weible’s (2010) in which the authors observed lowest agreement on
Conditions (Siddiki et al. agreement on Conditions = 80 percent; Basurto et
al. = 67 percent). After Conditions, Siddiki et al. observed lowest agreement on
oBjects (Siddiki et al. agreement on oBjects = 86 percent; Basurto et al. = N/A).4
The coding exercise was conducted primarily to gain a thorough understanding
of the policies’ content. Aggregated Deontic and Or else data were used to assess the
degree of policy coerciveness “on paper” (which contrasts to perceptions of policy
coerciveness examined in the interviews). Modal Attributes (i.e., individual or
corporate actors occurring most frequently in the policies) were identified to under-
stand the primary policy targets. Examples of modal Attributes from the policies
included aquaculture producers, aquaculture processors and handlers, and the
Marine Resources Commission. Finally, coded data also served as a basis for inter-
view questions and the Q-Sort exercise.
As a second step in the data collection process, interviews with 30 members of the
aquaculture communities of the two study states were conducted (15 per state). The
interviews consisted of two parts. In the first part, the researcher conducted a
semi-structured interview using a predesigned protocol. A modified random
sampling procedure was used to select aquaculturist interview participants in
Florida. In the absence of a publically available directory of Florida aquaculturists,
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a regulatory official provided the author with a demographically representative list
(with respect to the composition of the industry) of 50 aquaculture producers and
processors/handlers to contact for participation in the study. From this list, ten
individuals were randomly selected and agreed to participate. Those contacted
expressed varying degrees of familiarity with the state regulators. Random sam-
pling is an advantageous sampling method as it minimizes the potential for sam-
pling bias. Thus, the author sought to use this approach within the data availability
limitations. Beyond attenuating sample bias potential, a modified random sampling
procedure (as opposed to a purposive sampling procedure) was appropriate
because the author was not interested in interviewing a subgroup among the
population of aquaculturists in the state. The regulations selected for analysis in this
research are applicable to the entire population of Florida aquaculturists. The
remaining five interviewees in Florida were regulators. Regulators were included in
the interview sample because they are also subject to state aquaculture regulations,
and thus it was considered valuable to collect information regarding their policy
perceptions and compliance.
For Virginia, the researcher randomly selected 13 participants from an online
directory of Virginia aquaculture producers. The remaining two interviewees in
Virginia were regulators. As was the case in Florida, a random sampling technique
was considered suitable given the lack of analytical emphasis on any particular
population subgroup. The final sample of interview participants across the two
states consisted of 18 shellfish producers, seven regulatory officials, two ornamental
fish producers, two aquaculture processor/handler and ornamental fish producers,
and one shellfish and finfish producer. All of these categories of actors are governed
by the same set of aquaculture regulations; in other words, separate regulations do
not exist for different categories of actors.
The interview protocol used for the semi-structured portion of the interviews was
designed to collect information regarding perceptions of policy design, policy
history and context, and perceptions of policy effectiveness. To connect the inter-
view with coded data, the policy design questions were constructed in accordance
with IGT syntactic components. These questions are provided below. The Attribute
and oBject/aIm questions were used to capture perceptions of policy legitimacy.
The Deontic and Or else questions were used to capture perceptions of policy
coerciveness and enforcement. Condition questions were used to shed additional
light on deontic interpretations.
Attribute [A] You are one of the people most often referred to in this legislation. Does this accurately reflect
your level of involvement in the aquaculture industry?
oBject [B]/aIm [I] You are/are not listed is relation to many “items.” For example [oBject 1, oBject 2, and so on].
How do you think this reflects the scope of activities that you are involved in on a daily
basis?
Deontic [D] Some of the prescribed processes assigned to you in the legislation include [X]. How do you
interpret different prescriptive operators [may/may not/must/must not] in relation to these?
Condition [C] How do prescribed Conditions influence how you interpret prescriptive operators?
Or else [O] I noticed there [are/are not] a lot of sanctions described in the legislation for instances in
which compliance is not achieved. Why do you think this is the case? How do you feel
about the current level of stringency of state aquaculture regulations? Who holds you
accountable [people, organizations, and so on] for performing duties as prescribed in this
regulation?
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The interview protocol was pretested (as was the Q-Sort approach described
below) among eight aquaculture farmers and/or regulatory officials in Colorado.
The pretest results affirmed the validity of protocol questions. Prior to conducting
the interviews, the author compiled and familiarized herself with all institutional
statements related to the different modal Attributes (i.e., policy targets) so that
interview questions could be well tailored to the person being interviewed.
In the second part of the interviews, study participants were asked to participate
in a modified, structured Q-Sort exercise. The Q-Sort is a methodological technique
that allows study participants to subjectively sort a preselected set of statements
into a set of categories designated by the researcher (McKeown & Thomas,
1988). Sample statements can be chosen following an unstructured or structured
approach. In the structured approach, the researcher chooses the statements that
will be sorted based on prior collected information, such as through preliminary
interviews or from the examination of existing documents.
The Q-Sort exercise was used as another means to capture policy interpretation
but with more of an emphasis on understanding what policy targets actually do. As
such, data obtained therefrom were used to complement other data from the
interviews concerning policy interpretations. For the Q-Sort exercise, each partici-
pant was given a set of 20 cards containing institutional statements that describe
activities that relate to his/her position in relation to aquaculture, as prescribed in
the policy documents analyzed. However, missing from the card was the Deontic
associated with the activity identified in the institutional statement. For example,
one of the statements applying to Virginia aquaculture producers was the following:
“Aquaculture producers must submit a monthly harvest report to the Commission
[Virginia Marine Resources Commission] no later than the fifth of the following
month.” The Q-card that was given to the interviewee for this statement only read:
“Submit a monthly harvest report to the Commission.” The interviewee was asked
if he/she “must,” “must not,” “may,” or “may not” perform the activity described on
the card based on what he/she actually does (i.e., not what the interviewee knows or
thinks the policies say). As each card was placed into a Deontic category, the author
asked the participant to explain the placement of statements. For example, “why
did you place card X in Deontic category A?” In addition to capturing more detailed
responses, this question also helped the author affirm that the exercise was under-
stood correctly.
As both Virginia and Florida had multiple policies from which Q-Sort statements
were drawn, the number of statements chosen in the Q-Sort sample from each
document was proportionate to the number of statements in a particular document
relative to the total number of statements across all policy documents for a particu-
lar Attribute. To demonstrate this, Table 1 displays how the sample of Q-Sort
statements was selected for Florida aquaculture producers. For example, the aqua-
culture BMPs Rule contained 480 statements in which aquaculture producers was
the statement Attribute, accounting for 79 percent of the total statements pertaining
to aquaculture producers across all Florida aquaculture regulations. As such, the
number of statements to be included from the BMPs in the Q-Sort sample was 20
multiplied by 79 percent, or 16 cards. The statements were selected so as to
represent a variety of activities required of aquaculturists and regulators; for
example, statements relating to health and sanitation, administrative activities and
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reporting, importation, and infrastructure placement and design requirements.
Such activities are relevant in the day-to-day activities of aquaculture actors. In
addition, statements were selected so as to reflect deontic variance (i.e., must, may,
must not, and may not statements). The vast majority of interviewees indicated that
the selected statements pertain to their regular aquaculture activities.
Results
Results from this study are structured around the two questions guiding this
research: (i) What is the design of policies governing the behavior of aquaculture
participants in Florida and Virginia; and (ii) what is the relationship between
perceptions of policy legitimacy, perceptions of policy coerciveness, and enforce-
ment in shaping individuals’ reactions to regulations?
What Is the Design of Policies Governing the Behavior of Aquaculture Participants in
Florida and Virginia?
The assessment of policy design was based on the IGT coding of state aquaculture
policies in the two study states. Eight regulatory documents were coded for Virginia
(n = the number of institutional statements per document): Virginia State Code Ch.
28 relating to aquaculture (n = 82), Virginia State Code Ch. 150 relating to shellfish
sanitation (n = 13), Aquaculture Structures Rule (n = 10), Harvest Reporting Rule
(n = 32), Enclosures Rule (n = 63), Striped Bass Rule (n = 55), Cobia Rule (n = 16),
and the Shellfish Restrictions Rule (n = 32). The modal Attributes (i.e., policy targets
occurring most frequently in policy directives) from these regulations included the
Virginia Marine Resources Commission (VMRC), aquaculture producers, the Vir-
ginia State Legislature, the Graduate Marine Science Consortium, registered com-
mercial fishermen, seafood landing licensees, the Commissioner of Marine
Resources, and aquaculture purchasers. Four regulatory documents were coded for
Florida: Florida Statute Ch. 597 relating to aquaculture (n = 281), Florida BMPs
Rule (n = 544), the Florida Submerged Lands Statute relating to aquaculture
(n = 14), and the Florida Submerged Lands Rule (n = 172). The modal Attributes in
the legislation included the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer
Services (FDACS), aquaculture producers, the Florida state legislature, the Florida
Aquaculture Coordinating Council, the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation
Commission, and the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund.
With respect to policy coerciveness “on paper,” the results from a descriptive
analysis of IGT-coded data are provided in Table 2. Again, based on linguistic
Table 1. Sampling of Q-Sort Statements—Florida Aquaculture Producers




No. of Statements Out
of Twenty
Revised statute 66 11% 2
Best management practices rule 480 79% 16
Submerged lands rule 61 10% 2
Submerged lands statute N/A N/A N/A
Total 607 100% 20
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representation, coerciveness was operationalized in terms of the frequency of differ-
ent types of Deontics (i.e., prescriptive operators) used in the policy and the number
of Or elses (i.e., sanctions for noncompliance) across policy directives. The table
differentiates Deontic and Or else statements that were explicitly stated in particular
directives versus those that were implicit. In the case of implied Deontics and Or elses,
the policy documents contained clauses that indicated that a violation of any of the
directives contained therein was subject to legal penalties. In the interpretation of
Deontics, this means that all directives contain an implied “must,” though the actual
statements contain different Deontics. For the Or else category, the interpretation of
this is that all statements have an implied sanction for noncompliance. An example of
such as clause from the Florida BMP Rule is the following:
Any person who violates any provision of Chapter 597, F.S. [Florida Statute] or Rule 5L-3
F.A.C. [Best Management Practices Rule], commits a misdemeanor of the first degree and
is subject to a suspension or revocation of his or her certificate of registration. The
Department may, in lieu of, or in addition to the suspension or revocation, impose on the
violator an administrative fine in an amount not to exceed $1,000 per violation per day.
First time offenders will receive written notice of the BMP deficiencies and will be given 60
days to comply. Operators not in compliance with BMPs after 60 days will be fined $100–
$500 per day per occurrence depending upon the type of violation and circumstances
contributing to the violation (Florida Aquaculture Best Management Practices Rule).
For each of the Florida aquaculture policies at least 70 percent of the total
number of statements contained “must” Deontics. The percentage of “must” state-
ments in the Virginia regulations varied widely from 13 percent to 90 percent (VA
Code Ch. 150 = 13 percent, Aquaculture Structures Rule = 50 percent, Enclosures
Rule = 54 percent, Cobia Rule = 56 percent, VA Code Ch. 28 = 66 percent,
Striped Bass Rule = 67 percent, Shellfish Restrictions Rule = 72 percent, Harvest
















544 7 1 100 implicit;
53 explicit
7 7 100 <1
Florida statute chapter 597 281 17 1 100 implicit;
70 explicit
70 7 100 <1
Florida submerged lands rule 172 6 0 76 7 — — <1
Florida submerged lands statute 14 29 0 71 0 — — 0
Total statements 1011 — — — — — — —
Virginia
Virginia state code/statute Ch. 28 82 16 0 66 12 — — <1
Enclosures rule 63 16 0 54 21 — — <1
Striped bass 55 13 2 67 16 — — <1
Harvest reporting rule 32 7 0 90 10 — — 28
Shellfish restrictions 32 13 0 72 16 — — 22
Cobia 16 25 0 56 13 — — 13
VA code chapter 150 13 8 0 13 8 — — 0
Aquaculture structures/on-bottom
shellfish structures rule
10 10 10 50 30 — — 0
Total statements 303 — — — — — — —
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Reporting Rule = 90 percent). The highest number of “must” statements was
observed in the Harvest Reporting and Shellfish Restrictions Rule. Both of these
policies pertain to health and sanitation aspects of aquaculture production. Given
the potential gravity of violating the directives contained in such policies, it is
unsurprising that they contain stringent Deontics. Interestingly, although “must
not” statements did not represent a significant portion of the total statements in
either state, there were markedly more “must not” statements across the Virginia
policies than across the Florida policies. In Virginia, the percentage of “must not”
statements per document ranged from 8 percent to 30 percent (VA Code Ch.
150 = 8 percent, Harvest Reporting Rule = 10 percent, VA Code Ch. 28 = 12
percent, Cobia Rule = 13 percent, Shellfish Restrictions Rule = 16 percent, Striped
Bass Rule = 16 percent, Enclosures Rule = 21 percent, Aquaculture Structures
Rule = 30 percent), whereas in Florida the percentage of “must not” statements
ranged from 0 percent to 7 percent (FL Submerged Lands Statute = 0 percent, FL
Statute Ch. 597 = 7 percent, FL BMP Rule = 7 percent, FL Submerged Lands
Rule = 7 percent). Given, however, that “must not” statements did not comprise a
significant proportion of overall statements, Florida is still considered to have more
stringent regulations based on the high presence of “must” statements.
Because the interviewee sample included both regulators and farmers, the
author also sought to determine if there were any discernible differences between
policy directives targeted at aquaculturists and those targeted at regulators, with
respect to coerciveness on paper. An analysis of Attribute and Deontic data revealed
that there were no marked differences in either state in Deontic use depending on
who is the modal Attribute across the two states’ regulations. That is, a higher or
lesser degree of Deontic coerciveness was not evident for documents aimed at
different types of actors (e.g., regulating agency versus aquaculturists). In Florida,
for example, “must” Deontics were applied just as frequently to the FDACS in Ch.
597 of the State’s Statute as they were to aquaculturists in the BMP Rule. If one
considers the explicit use of “must” Deontics in these two documents, statements
pertaining to the FDACS contained more Deontics. Similarly, in Virginia, there
were no major differences between type of Deontic used and primary Attribute. The
only regulation from Virginia in which aquaculturists are not the primary Attribute
is the Virginia State Code. In this document, the VMRC is the primary Attribute,
appearing in 26 percent of the total statements, and aquaculturists are the second
most frequently occurring Attribute, appearing in 24 percent of the total state-
ments. In the entire document, 66 percent of the statements contain must Deontics;
26 percent of linked to the VMRC and 16 percent of which are linked to aquacul-
turists. In all of the other regulations from Virginia, aquaculturists are the primary
Attribute and the majority of statements contain “must” Deontics.
What Is the Relationship between Perceptions of Policy Legitimacy, Perceptions
of Policy Coerciveness, and Enforcement in Shaping Individuals’ Reactions
to Regulations?
Perceptions of policy legitimacy were obtained using Attribute, aIm (i.e., activity),
and oBject (receiver of activity) questions in the semi-structured portion of the
interviews. These questions focused mainly on obtaining perceptions relating to
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whether the role of target populations was accurately reflected in the policies
(Attribute) and whether the activities assigned to individual Attributes in the policies
accurately represent the scope of their daily activities (oBject/aIm). By and large,
interviewees across the two states indicated that modal Attributes from the policies
were also those who are most involved in their respective aquaculture industries. In
Virginia, many interviewees commented that the one important entity not included
in the policies is the State Health Department. The Virginia State Health Depart-
ment tends to handle matters pertaining to consumer and product safety (e.g.,
health and sanitation), though some health and sanitation regulations are also
handled through the VMRC. Virginia interviewees indicated that they felt regula-
tions were adequately broad in scope (i.e., appropriately reflect the array of activi-
ties in which policy target populations are regularly engaged), though some said
that certain policy directives are more or less applicable in different geographical or
species contexts. Interviewees also cited several issues they felt were inappropriately
dealt with in the policies, including those relating to temperature controls in
aquaculture transport, leasing, aquaculture opportunity zones, and taxes.
In Florida, several interviewees commented that the role of State Water Man-
agement Districts and the Department of Environmental Protection is not reflected
in the policies. State Water Management Districts provide well permits to aquacul-
ture producers and dictate how much water they are allowed to use in their
operations. Similar to Virginia, Florida interviewees also commented that regula-
tions cover the full scope of their aquaculture activities. A frequently observed
comment by interviewees was that it is important for policies to be broad in scope
in order to effectively capture the nuances of aquaculture production.
More interesting results, however, concerned how perceptions of policy legiti-
macy tempered perceptions of policy coerciveness. Perceptions of policy coercive-
ness were assessed using Deontic and Or else questions from the semi-structured
part of the interviews. The Condition (i.e., temporal, spatial, and/or procedural
boundaries of an activity) question was also used to collect additional insight regard-
ing Deontic interpretations. Thus, together, these questions focused mainly on
capturing how individuals interpret different types of prescriptive operators or
Deontics (must, must not, may, and may not); how temporal, spatial, and proce-
dural conditions affect Deontic interpretation; and whether policies are perceived
as being appropriately stringent (Or else). In both states, less than half of all
interviewees reported a strict interpretation of Deontics. In Virginia, many
interviewees stated that they adhere to those Deontics that make sense to them, are
appropriate in the context of their aquaculture operation, or are perceived as being
good for their product.
However, there were several issues that interviewees described as having little
room for interpretation, regardless of perceptions of legitimacy. For example, in
Virginia, several interviewees commented on the inappropriateness of new tem-
perature control regulations, but further explained that one had to follow the letter
of the law when it came to directives pertaining to such. Other such issues included
health and sanitation and aquaculture product tracking. In Florida, these issues
were water impacts, health, wetlands, and non-native species. The following com-
ments by Florida interviewees—one aquaculture producer and one regulator
official—speak to this point:
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Regulations are pretty flexible. There are times when the “must” is counter-productive as
there might be a better way to do something. There are some regulations, though, where
there is more rigidity. For example, water regulations. You must hold water back in ditches
before discharging. . . Other areas for which there is less flexibility in interpretation
include pesticide use and record keeping. (Interviewee ID: 018—Aquaculture Producer)
There are three areas that are most consequential and where “musts” are the most
important—wetlands, water impacts, and non-native species—areas relating to preventing
negative environmental impacts. There is more leniency in enforcing those aspects of the
regulations that pertain to business practices. (Interviewee ID: 013—Regulator)
Interviewees in both states reported that temporal, spatial, and procedural
conditions are important for specifying the applicability of policy directives in
different contexts or situations. Similar to comments made in response to the
scope-related question (i.e., oBject/aIm question), many interviewees across both
states said that such details are necessary given that aquaculture production is site
and species sensitive.
The results from the interviews also indicated that enforcement practices temper
perceptions of policy coerciveness. Again, enforcement was assessed using
responses to one of the Or else questions. Consistent with responses to the Deontic
question, interviewees from Florida indicated that while state aquaculture policies
would be characterized as relatively coercive on paper, in reality enforcement of
them is relatively lenient. Using May and Winter’s (1999) categorization, lenient
enforcement was reported on both “formal,” or rigid application, and “coercion,”
or sanction administration (May & Winter, 1999) dimensions. Relating to “formal”
enforcement, several interviewees commented that the FDACS purposefully
allowed for flexibility in the policies by designing them to be “goal oriented rather
than process oriented” (Interviewee IDs: 019, 021, and 022). Though the policies
themselves would seem to imply otherwise, one Florida aquaculture producer
commented, “DACS [Division of Aquaculture and Consumer Services] has an end
result that they want to achieve and there is some wiggle room for producers in
getting to these end results” (Interviewee ID: 019). A regulatory representative
confirmed these sentiments relating to “coercion” enforcement by commenting that
penalties are infrequently administered in instances of noncompliance. Instead, the
regulators seek to work with aquaculture producers when noncompliance is
observed instead of administering a penalty outright. Linking enforcement style to
policy legitimacy, one DACS regulatory official offered the following concerning the
distinctiveness of policy design in the aquaculture context:
The situation is that there are a lot of small farms in FL that are located in very different
geographical locations. The Agency allows flexibility [in interpretation of regulations]
because otherwise the agency would need to write many more regulations in order to cater
to the diverse circumstances of aquaculture producers. This would just be way too com-
plicated. (Interviewee ID: 022)
In contrast, in Virginia, both aquaculturists and regulators reported strict
enforcement on the “coercion,” or sanctioning, dimension. One regulatory official
stated that misdemeanors and felonies are commonly administered in cases of
noncompliance. As such, the findings reveal an interesting, and unanticipated
finding; whereas Florida regulations are more stringent on paper, they are leniently
enforced in reality. Moreover, although Virginia regulations are relatively
nonstringent on paper, they are stringently enforced.
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Data obtained through the Q-Sort exercise were used to complement other
interview data collected to understand policy interpretation but with more of an
emphasis on getting a better understanding of what policy targets are actually doing
(i.e., how their interpretations manifest in practice). Table 3 displays the results
from this Q-Sort exercise; specifically, agreement between prescribed Deontics
associated with policy statements and Deontics selected by interview participants
associated with policy directives. “Agreement” means that an interviewee placed the
statement in a Deontic category in a manner that matched the form of the directive
in the policy document. To remind, interviewees were asked to select the Deontic
category for individual statements that best reflected what they actually do rather
than what they think or know the regulation says.
Average agreement varied widely: in Florida from 41 percent to 77 percent and
in Virginia from 25 percent to 80 percent. The findings from the Q-Sort exercise
show that agreement was highest for “must” statements (average agreement = 79
percent) and lowest for “may” (average agreement = 40 percent) and “may not”
statements (average agreement = 38 percent). Such findings indicate that, consis-
tent with the Deontic reasoning literature, individuals are attuned to the more
constraining nature of obliging than permissible Deontics, and this is reportedly
reflected in their behavioral response. Virginia and Florida differed in levels of
agreement relating to “must not” statements, with much higher disagreement being
observed in Virginia.
More interesting perhaps is the substantive topics on which there was more or
less agreement. Table 3 also displays the issues on which there was the least amount
of agreement on Deontics. In Virginia, the most disagreement was observed on
issues pertaining to the use of hydraulic dredges (must not), infrastructure design
(must not), placement of temporary protective enclosures (must not and may), and
navigation (may not). In explaining their placement of Q-cards, interviewees
expressed mixed remarks relating to the use of hydraulic dredges indicating a high
degree of ambiguity regarding this directive. Regarding directives pertaining to
temporary protective enclosures and navigation, several interviewees commented
on the inapplicability of such directives. In particular, several interviewees chal-
lenged a directive that forbids the placement of enclosures upon submerged aquatic
vegetation saying that shellfish actually help this type of vegetation (Interviewee
IDs: 007, 008, 010, and 011). Furthermore, one interviewee commented that some
Table 3. Summary of Q-Sort Results
Virginia Florida Total
Issues with Most Disagreement
with Policies (VA)
Issues with Most Disagreement
with Policies (FL)
Must 80% 77% 79% Few issues with high disagreement Treatment and retaining of effluent
Must not 34% 69% 50% Use of hydraulic dredge, extending
structures higher than 12 inches,
placement of temporary protective
enclosures
Discharge of effluent into wetlands
May 39% 41% 40% Placement of temporary enclosures Treatment and discharge of effluent
May not 25% 52% 38% Effects on navigation from
aquaculture activities
Discharge of effluent, sale and
transfer of Atlantic Sturgeon,
medication use for extra-label
purposes
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of the statements relating to enclosures and navigation are only applicable in certain
geographic areas (Interviewee ID: 008).
In Florida, most disagreement was observed, across all four Deontic categories,
regarding treatment and discharge of effluent, particularly in wetlands. Regarding
this type of directive, some farmers commented that aquaculture waste does not
actually pose significant detriment to the environment (Interviewee IDs: 015 and
020). Several farmers commented that there is ambiguity in the definition of a
wetland in the regulations and/or the enforcement of the directive. For example,
one farmer commented, “The definition of a wetland is vague. It is difficult to
know if something is actually a wetland” (Interviewee ID: 015). Another said,
“This rule is currently handled subjectively but will probably be more defined in
the future” (Interviewee ID: 020). In the “may not” category, the sale and transfer
of Atlantic sturgeon and use of medications for extra label purposes were also
issues on which high discrepancy was noted. Regarding the inappropriateness of
the medication rule, one farmer commented, “It is very expensive for the aqua-
culture industry to get a label to define a product as specific to aquaculture
purposes. The industry is too small to afford such costs. So, sometimes [we] use
products for extra label use. For example, it might be a product that is meant for
another animal but works for aquaculture” (Interviewee ID: 018). Another inter-
viewee commented, “Some drugs are not always effective as they are prescribed to
be used” (Interviewee ID: 020).
Discussion of Results and Conclusions
Effective governance ultimately hinges on how individuals interpret and respond to
policy directives (Robichau & Lynne, 2009; Tyler, 2006). As such, this research was
focused, first, on gaining a systematic understanding of policy design and, second,
assessing individuals’ perceptions of policy legitimacy, coerciveness, and enforce-
ment and the relationships between these factors. Overall, the results suggest that
(i) perceptions of regulatory coerciveness depend, in large part, on the substantive
focus of individual directives; (ii) lenient enforcement of regulations—on both
“formal” and “coercion” dimensions (May & Winter, 1999)—leads to more relaxed
interpretations of directives; and (iii) perceptions of policy legitimacy temper per-
ceptions of policy coerciveness, but only sometimes. Several interviewees who par-
ticipated in the study commented that they are less likely to follow regulatory
directives exactly if they are perceived as being inappropriate. Many of these same
interviewees commented, however, that there are certain directives that must be
strictly followed even if they question their legitimacy.
In order to fully interpret the findings from this research, it is important to also
note how they reflect peculiarities of the aquaculture context. By and large, aqua-
culturists have an incentive to comply voluntarily with regulatory policies—
especially those that are meant to protect consumers’ health or the industry at large.
This is reflected in the comments of aquaculturists who expressed strict Deontic
interpretations when it comes to policy directives relating to health and sanitation.
This sentiment is reflected in one Virginia aquaculture producer’s comments:
“When it comes to expectations to be penalized for non-compliance, it depends on
the regulations. No one wants to do anything that would compromise the quality or
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safety of the product—a better, safer product benefits everybody; temperature
controls are a pain, but at the end of the day, they are good thing” (Interviewee
ID: 008).
At the same time, aquaculture is a highly technical trade that requires an astute
understanding of the biological dimensions of farming, as well as some understand-
ing of business and policy. As expressed in the interviews, state-level policies, even
though comprehensive, simply cannot capture all of the geographic- and species-
specific considerations relating to aquaculture production, processing/handling,
and regulation. Thus, several interviewees admitted to relaxed interpretations of
Deontics that they feel are not relevant to their operation. This reality makes it
particularly important to assess within this industry context the degree to which the
policies are reflecting the least common denominator when it comes to these
primary aquaculture processes.
These findings also suggest relevance of this research in the global context,
wherein regulatory mechanisms relating to aquaculture can be more or less central-
ized than in the United States (Rana, 2005). Centralization here refers to the level of
government that serves as the locus of policy-making and administrative (i.e.,
policy-implementation) activity. The European Union, for example, is similar to the
United States in terms of development of regulations but maintains a largely
centralized regulatory framework in their handling of the industry (Fisheries and
Aquaculture Department, 1999). Given the empirically verified importance of
reflecting the geographic- and species-specific nuances inherent to aquaculture
rearing and husbandry in industry regulations, this research serves as a springboard
for a comparative study that examines perceptions of policy legitimacy, coerciveness,
and enforcement in countries where a single national policy and agency is used to
govern the aquaculture industry in comparison with the United States where
aquaculture regulatory responsibilities are devolved to the state level. A higher
degree of regulatory centralization could have important ramifications on the scope
of activities included with regulations as well as the frequency and stringency of
enforcement.
In connection with the broader scholarship on policy design, the characteristics of
the U.S. aquaculture context, in particular, make it suitable for addressing a variety
of enduring questions relating to policy design. For example, the variation in designs
of aquaculture policies across states prompts questions concerning the antecedent
organizational and institutional factors and collective decision-making processes that
shape their designs. Furthermore, one could employ similar coding techniques as
used in this paper to decipher the specific policy instruments incorporated into the
design of policies across states as a basis to understand how the use of different
instruments to regulate the industry are more or less effective in achieving outcomes
of interest (Salamon, 2002). Similarly, one could use these techniques to systemati-
cally assess which aspects or components are shared across state policy designs in an
effort to uncover instances of policy diffusion (Berry & Berry, 2007).
Finally, it should be noted that despite being tied somewhat to characteristics of
the aquaculture context, the lessons learned within this setting are also generaliz-
able to other natural resource-based industries. For example, it is expected that
such findings might be transferable to any comparable industry wherein product
integrity poses grave implications (e.g., human health impacts), the industry is both
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maintained and constrained by the availability of natural resources, there are
environmental policies in place targeted at reducing negative externalities, the
industry is highly visible or sensitive to public pressure, and/or the regulated trade
is highly technical in nature.
Overall, results from this research provide useful insight into the decision-
making processes of regulatees. Furthermore, this research suggests that better
knowledge of policy interpretation can assist both the policy scholar and practitio-
ner in honing in on the particular aspects of policies that are likely to be met with
the most amount of resistance and be least effective. Beyond these general uses,
this research also offers two specific contributions to the public policy literature.
The first contribution is linking an assessment of policy perceptions with elements
of policy design. In doing so, this research builds on recent efforts to more sys-
tematically analyze the specific language of policies rather than general character-
istics thereof in analyzing how policy design may relate to behavioral outcomes
(Mondou & Montpetit, 2010; Siddiki et al., 2011). Pairing the IGT-based content
analysis with in-depth interviews helped to gain a comprehensive understanding of
policy design and capture nuanced responses concerning how interviewees
think and feel about aspects of aquaculture policies across the two study states.
The second contribution is the analysis of relationships between policy legitimacy,
coerciveness, and enforcement in affecting policy interpretations. Policy interpre-
tation has been understudied in the literature. It is, however, useful because
it is considered a logical antecedent to compliance (Ajzen, 1991) and thus can signal
the potential for noncompliance and/or implementation challenges. Highlight-
ing the interdependencies between the concepts explored is analytically consistent
with the literature on regulatory compliance wherein scholars repeatedly demon-
strate that compliance is simultaneously motivated by a diverse array of factors
(May, 2005).
Of course, this research is not without limitations. First, what this analysis does
not show are motivations relating to factors beyond policy design that can influ-
ence how individuals interpret policy directives. For example, this interpretat-
ion can be influenced by a wide variety of motivations stemming from their
personal experiences and social environments. These include, feeling morally
compelled to follow the law, perceiving policy compliance to serve instrumental
values, fears of financial penalties, or reputational concerns (Crawford &
Ostrom, 1995; Ryan & Deci, 2000). However, attention to these factors is outside
of the analytical purview of this particular paper. Second, this research relies
on self-reported data. This limitation was overcome somewhat by the fact
that the author was able to ask interviewees follow-up questions to assess the
validity of their responses. Through this ability, she is confident in the research
results.
Given the diversity of motivations that may inform how individuals interpret and
respond to policies, a next step in this research is to analyze how motivations
stemming from individual and social contexts that, in concert with those factors
explored herein, influence behavior. Additionally, future research should involve
alternative forms of data collection, such as surveys, to explore causal relationships
between the factors explored in this study and how the IGT can be useful in
supporting such an effort.
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Notes
1 This preliminary study involved interviews with 10 and a survey of 56 state aquaculture coordinator
members of the National Association of State Aquaculture Coordinators (NASAC) (response
rate = 57 percent). NASAC is an affiliate of the National Association of State Departments of Agri-
culture. NASAC’s primary mission is to assist in the development of the U.S. aquaculture industry
by providing resources to state aquaculture representatives. NASAC members are highly knowl-
edgeable concerning regulatory and/or technical matters relating to the aquaculture industry. These
individuals are either state aquaculture coordinators or selected to serve as representatives to
NASAC either due to their professional position or influence in the respective aquaculture com-
munities. Some states have one representative, whereas others have more. This preliminary study
yielded both qualitative and quantitative data, describing perceptions of state regulatory and com-
munity characteristics pertaining to regulatory mechanisms and compliance with state level aqua-
culture regulations in 30 states.
2 These state aquaculture coordinators were members of the National Association of State Aquaculture
Coordinators at the time the study was conducted. Again, these individuals are highly knowledgeable
concerning regulatory and/or technical matters relating to the aquaculture industry.
3 The original grammar did not include the oBject as an institutional statement component. The oBject
was introduced by Siddiki et al. (2011) in an effort to clarify coding guidelines and enhance the
applicability of the IGT.
4 At the time that Basurto et al. conducted their coding exercise, the oBject had not yet been introduced
into the IGT coding framework. The oBject was introduced by Siddiki et al. (2011).
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Appendix. Case Selection Variables
Case One: Virginia Case Two: Florida
Policy characteristics
• Regulatory stringency Non-stringent regulations Very stringent
Political and regulatory factors
• Regulatory clarity Very clear regulations Very clear regulations
• Permitting costs Inexpensive permits Inexpensive permits
• Industry involvement in reporting non-compliance Moderate involvement Moderate involvement
• Regulatory clarity as a contributor to compliance Significant contributor Significant contributor
• Strong penalties as a contributor to compliance Mild contributor Mild contributor
• Industry trust of monitoring and enforcement officials as a
contributor to compliance
Moderate contributor Moderate contributor
Social, community, and industry factors
• Start up costs as a barrier to aquaculture development Significant barrier Significant barrier
• Stringent environmental protection regulations and
safeguards as a barrier to aquaculture development
Moderate barrier Moderate barrier
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